An Experiment in Conservative Modernity:Interwar Conservatism and Henry Ford's English Farms by Kowol, Kit
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1017/jbr.2016.69
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Kowol, K. (2016). An Experiment in Conservative Modernity: Interwar Conservatism and Henry Ford's English
Farms. JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIES, 55(4), 781-805. https://doi.org/10.1017/jbr.2016.69
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 09. Jul. 2020
Journal of British Studies
 
An Experiment in Conservative Modernity: Interwar Conservatism and Henry Ford's
English Farms
--Manuscript Draft--
 
Manuscript Number: 3342R2
Full Title: An Experiment in Conservative Modernity: Interwar Conservatism and Henry Ford's
English Farms
Article Type: Original Manuscript
Corresponding Author: Kit Kowol, DPhil
Teesside University
Middlesbrough, UNITED KINGDOM
Corresponding Author Secondary
Information:
Corresponding Author's Institution: Teesside University
Corresponding Author's Secondary
Institution:
First Author: Kit Kowol, DPhil
First Author Secondary Information:
Order of Authors: Kit Kowol, DPhil
Order of Authors Secondary Information:
Abstract: Between 1931 and 1947, the American industrialist Henry Ford financed a British
agricultural experiment at the Fordson Estate in the Essex countryside. This article
analyses the Fordson experiment as it developed from a limited attempt to test the
merits of American farming methods into a wider model for remaking British industry
and society. Focusing closely on Sir Percival Perry, a Conservative Party activist and
Ford's partner in the venture, it explores the extent to which the experiment sought to
harmonize modern technology with traditional patterns of life. In doing so, the article
places the history of the Fordson Estate within the paradigm of interwar conservative
modernity. By tracing Perry's participation within a network of industrial paternalist
organizations and delineating his connection to the interwar Conservative movement,
the article demonstrates that conservative modernity stood largely outside formal party
politics but was central to the praxis of interwar Conservatism. It highlights an
experimental, radical, and utopian form of Conservative politics that aimed to foster
Conservative rural citizens.
Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
 1 
      Journal of British Studies 
Volume 55, no. 4 (October 2016) 
Kowol 
Major Article 
 
An Experiment in Conservative Modernity: Interwar Conservatism and Henry Ford’s English 
Farms 
Kit Kowol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of British Studies 55:4 (October 2016): - 
© 2016 by The North American Conference on British Studies 
All Rights Reserved  
  
Manuscript Click here to download Manuscript 3342_Kowol_Final.docx 
 2 
 
       Journal of British Studies 
Volume 55, no. 4 (October 2016) 
Kowol 
Major Article 
 
An Experiment in Conservative Modernity: 
Interwar Conservatism and Henry Ford’s English Farms 
 
Few places differ so much as the Essex countryside and the Amazon rain forest: the 
gently undulating fields compared to the dark foreboding jungle, the mild temperate conditions 
in contrast to the sticky stifling heat, the human isolation versus a county bordering a great 
capital city. Yet, for all their differences, during the 1930s both locations shared a number of 
similarities. In the midst of a global recession, their native industries—mixed farming in Essex 
and rubber tapping in Brazil—faced acute financial difficulties. As a result, both areas witnessed 
pronounced rural depopulation. Moreover, in both locations, those left behind faced the gradual 
encroachment of modernity, ushering in changes that were altering traditional patterns of life. 
Finally, and central to this article, both attracted the attention of the carmaker Henry Ford, the 
most famous industrialist of the era. In both Brazil and Essex, Ford embarked upon bold schemes 
designed to reverse these trends and show how the techniques of mass production, scientific 
management, and high wages that he had used to revolutionise the car industry could be adapted 
to serve the interests of agriculture and the rural community. 
The first of these experiments, Fordlandia in Brazil, is relatively well known today thanks 
 3 
to Greg Grandin’s Pulitzer Prize-winning book on the subject.1 Between 1927 and the end of the 
Second World War, Ford struggled in vain to create a rubber plantation in a location totally 
unsuited to the task. Indeed, the story of Fordlandia has proved so captivating that it even 
inspired a computer game that allows players to walk amidst the decaying remnants of saw mills 
and midwestern-style houses previously only visible to the most intrepid of tourists.2 By contrast, 
the less exotic setting, as well as a lack of accessible records, has ensured that Ford’s agricultural 
activities in Essex have been all but forgotten.3 
Accounts of what became known as the Fordson Experiment are today relegated to a few 
pages in a book on the area’s interwar history and a single chapter in a piece of Ford enthusiast 
literature.4 Nonetheless, for a time during the 1930s, a corner of Essex became popularly known 
as Ford County as a result of the automaker’s innovative experiment in farming and land 
settlement. Developed in partnership with Sir Percival (later Lord) Perry—a businessman, 
Conservative activist, and the chairman of Ford Motors in the UK—the experiment’s 
combination of mechanized farming, canny marketing, and profit sharing were, for a brief 
moment, held up as a model for British agriculture. It was examined closely by the Ministry of 
Agriculture as a potential example to be copied for the resettlement of the unemployed, and 
                                                        
1 Greg Grandin, Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s Forgotten Jungle City (London, 
2010). 
2 The Amazon Trail II, Amazon Trail (Brooklyn, 1997) Video Game. 
3 The overwhelming majority of the estate’s papers were accidently destroyed in the early 1990s. 
4 Ford R. Bryan, Beyond the Model T: The Other Ventures of Henry Ford (Detroit, 1990), 27–34; 
Fred Rideout, “The Ford Connection,” in Boreham: History, Tales and Memories of an Essex 
Village, ed. Eleanor Burgess and Mary Rance (Lavenham, 1988), 106–12. 
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celebratory accounts of Ford and Perry’s experiment filled the contemporary local, national, and 
international press.5 One article in the Observer even went so far as to suggest that Henry Ford 
be invited to become British Minister of Agriculture.6 
As is the case with Fordlandia, Ford’s Essex experiment can be read in a number of 
ways: a case study in Americanization, a history of agricultural commercialization, or simply a 
story of personal hubris. These frames of reference help make sense of the different elements that 
went into the creation and life of the Ford farms, which operated, in one form or another, 
between 1931 and 1972. However, the participation of a number of British Conservative activists 
in the scheme, the desire to restore an older imagined pattern of harmonious rural life, combined 
with faith in the role modern methods could play in achieving this, means that the Fordson 
Experiment is best understood as a quintessential example of interwar conservative modernity. 
A term originally employed by Alison Light, conservative modernity refers to what she 
saw as the dominant cultural mood of interwar Britain.7 For Light, in her study of the period’s 
popular middle-class female literature, this form of modernity was “Janus-faced.” 8 Capable of 
looking forward as well as back, conservative modernity required a new type of Conservatism 
and a new understanding of national character: Domestic, feminine, and “English,” conservative 
modernity acted as a counterpoint to a version of Englishness that was masculine, aggressive, 
                                                        
5 “Ford Purchases Boreham House,” China Press (Shanghai), 25 May 1931; “Ford’s Co-
Operative Farms: Profits and Bonuses for Workers” West Australian (Perth), 12 April 1935. 
6 “Land and Life: Mr. Henry Ford’s Farm,” Observer (London), 10 November 1935. 
7 Alison Light, Forever England: Femininity, Literature and Conservatism between the Wars 
(London, 1991). 
8 Ibid., 10. 
 5 
and imperial, but which had fallen out of favour in the aftermath of the First World War. 
As a number of historians have recently shown, such a cultural form of conservatism was 
also reflected in the attitude and actions of the Conservative Party in the 1920s and 30s. As 
Philip Williamson’s work on Stanley Baldwin demonstrates, conservative modernity was the 
hallmark of Baldwin’s speechmaking and central to the construction of his own personal 
“gentlemanly” image. As Williamson notes, in Baldwin’s rhetoric, the imagery of rural England 
and the idea that it was the nation’s “spiritual home,” was prominent. Yet, Baldwin also 
suggested that this rural inheritance lived on, not in the outmoded aristocrat, but within the 
“capitalist individualist,” the “company moderniser,” and “the active citizen.”9 Clarisse 
Berthezène’s analysis of the Conservative Party’s interwar training college at Ashridge Hall in 
Hertfordshire presents a similar story. Ashridge’s location was deliberately selected for its 
pastoral setting and the spirit of “merrie England” it evoked. Revelling in rural elegies, 
Ashridge’s participants nonetheless helped construct a new type of Conservative “middle-brow” 
intellectual that embraced professional expertise.10 David Jarvis and David Thackeray have 
shown in their work on women and the Conservative Party a similar capacity to hold both past 
and future together in the party’s gendered political appeal; for example, it embraced modern 
campaign communications directed at women while simultaneously emphasizing their domestic 
                                                        
9 Philip Williamson, Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values 
(Cambridge, 1999), 259. 
10 Clarisse Berthezène, Training Minds for the War of Ideas: Ashridge College, the Conservative 
Party and the Cultural Politics of Britain, 192954 (Manchester, 2015). 
 6 
status.11 
Such analyses of interwar Conservatism have reshaped our understanding of the 
dominant political force of interwar Britain. Rather than emphasizing the party’s ability to 
construct an anti-Labour electoral bloc based on negative stereotypes of the working class—the 
central point of Ross McKibbin’s influential work on the creation of a Conservative interwar 
“public”—these authors have instead stressed interwar Conservatism’s positive appeal and its 
ability to attract multiple political, social, denominational, and regional groups.12 Building on 
this work, this article offers a case study in interwar Conservative politics and the conservative 
modernity it embraced. However, rather than examining rhetoric, political communication, or a 
cultural mood, by analyzing the politics of Ford’s Essex estate this article examines conservative 
modernity and interwar Conservatism in a physical form. In doing so, it treats the Fordson 
experiment as its founders intended: as an enacted Conservative utopia for an imagined “modern” 
age. 
 
Making the Fordson Estate 
The origins of Ford’s Essex experiment lay in his longstanding belief in the virtue of 
                                                        
11 David Jarvis, “Mrs. Maggs and Betty: The Conservative Appeal to Women Voters in the 
1920s,” Twentieth Century British History 5, no. 2 (January 1994): 129–52; David Thackeray, 
Conservatism for the Democratic Age: Conservative Culture and the Challenge of Mass Politics 
in Early Twentieth Century England (Manchester, 2013), 13548. 
12 Ross McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class (Oxford, 1990), 25993. 
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workers combining agricultural and industrial labor.13 Such an arrangement, Ford believed, led 
to greater industrial and political stability. Workers who could grow their own food were less 
likely to engage in industrial agitation in periods of economic downturn. Likewise, Ford, who 
had himself grown up on a farm (though he personally disliked agricultural work) saw it as 
making men more productive, efficient, and proud when they returned to the factory.14 
This idea of “machines in the garden” was particularly popular in early twentieth-century 
America, but Ford’s belief in the virtues of agricultural work was also shared by many interwar 
Conservatives.15 In the 1920s, Baldwin himself had been a keen supporter of relocating factories 
to the countryside, but Baldwin and the governments he dominated in the 1930s shifted their 
attention to questions of rural electrification and the development of Britain’s road network as a 
means to draw the countryside closer in economics and experience to the city. Ford, however, 
persevered with the idea of transformation in the other direction: not taking the countryside to 
the city, but the city to countryside. 
In 1929, Ford sought to combine the rural with the urban by choosing to locate his new 
car manufacturing plant at Dagenham on the marshes to the east of London. In addition to 
choosing a rural location for his new factory, Ford made allotments available for Dagenham 
employees to grow their own produce and raise their own animals, ensuring that they could share 
                                                        
13 See also, Howard P. Segal, Recasting the Machine Age: Henry Ford’s Village Industries 
(Amherst, MA, 2005). 
14 Reynold M. Wik, Henry Ford and Grass-Roots America (Ann Arbor, 1972), 191. 
15 Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America, 
(Oxford, 1964). 
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in a rural way of life.16 Yet, as with Fordlandia, the land identified by Ford was totally 
inappropriate for the task he had set for it. The man leading the development of the Dagenham 
plant, Sir Percival Perry, persuaded Ford to abandon the plan of creating allotments at Dagenham. 
Instead, Perry suggested that his employer purchase land further afield to be used, not for 
allotments, but to test another of Ford’s pet beliefs: that mechanization and US farming 
techniques could and should be applied to Britain as a means to raise agricultural productivity.17 
The site Perry and Ford chose to test the merits of American agricultural practices was 
close to the village of Boreham, located thirty miles south east of London. The estate they found 
at Boreham nonetheless failed to fit the image of the English countryside as a gentle, manicured, 
gardenlike idyll. Rather, like many others in England at that time, the estate was largely 
dilapidated. Having passed out of the hands of its longstanding owners, the aristocratic Kenyon 
family, the estate had been rented to a London financier more interested in sport than farming. 
Much of its land was, as a result, left rough and uncultivated and many of its cottages unfit for 
human habitation.18 
The site at Boreham was chosen because it contained the features necessary for Ford’s 
vision of highly mechanized, commercial farming. It was in a prime area for market gardening, 
                                                        
16 Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, 245. 
17 Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, “Interview with Lord Perry of Stock Harber [sic] by Allan 
Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill on March 28, 1952 at Nassau,” 28 March 1952, Accession 834, 
Folder 1, 48, The Henry Ford [henceforth THF]. 
18 “The Boreham House Estate,” 5 May 1931, Fairlane Subgroup, Accession 1, Box 185, Folder 
7, THF. 
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one of the few forms of cultivation thought to be reliably profitable in the 1930s.19 Multiple 
nearby farms could be purchased to generate economies of scale. It was also just twenty-five 
miles from Dagenham and thus had a ready market for its products—though the idea that 
Dagenham workers would spend time on the land was quickly dropped when it became apparent 
to the Estate’s manager that factory workers had neither the necessary skills nor attitude for 
farming.20 With these advantages in mind, the estate, which included the elegant Georgian 
mansion, Boreham House, was purchased in 1931 for close to forty-five thousand pounds and 
renamed the Fordson Estate to mirror the brand name of the Ford Motor Company’s tractors.20 
The transformation of the estate was slow. For every two pounds spent purchasing the 
land an additional one pound was needed to prepare it for cultivation.21 Ford’s idiosyncratic 
demands also exacerbated existing problems: he insisted that no game birds be raised—a 
requirement on all his properties––and his desire to preserve trees was at odds with his demand 
to make farming as mechanically efficient as possible.22 This, however, the estate eventually 
achieved. Fordson tractors were employed throughout to plough, cultivate, drill, and hoe the land, 
with Ford lorries used to transport goods to and from the market, though their noise and speed 
                                                        
19 Alun Howkins, The Death of Rural England: A Social History of the Countryside since 1900 
(London, 2003), 48–49. 
20 The National Archives (henceforth, TNA), A. H. Hoare, “Fordson Estates, Ltd., Boreham, 
Essex,” 16 April 1935, Ministry of Agriculture (henceforth, MAF) 48/284. 
20 “The Boreham House Estate.” 
21 Percival L. D. Perry, Ten Years’ Romance: An Agricultural Experiment (Boreham, 1945), 4. 
22 Charles Sorensen to Percival Perry, “Fordson Estates, Ltd,” 29 October 1931, Charles E. 
Sorensen Records, Accession 38, Box 5, BFRC, THF. 
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caused consternation among locals.23 Finally, Boreham House was transformed into a school for 
agricultural engineering. The school, however, accepted only men—a decision that reflected not 
only Ford’s gendered view of farming but also his preference (and Perry’s) for employing men 
on a “family wage” so as to maintain the traditional family structure.24 In the long run, though 
Ford’s vision and beliefs played a vital role in the estate, it would be Perry who shaped the 
experiment’s direction. Able to manipulate his employer’s will and considerable resources, Perry 
engineered the farming venture as a means to demonstrate his own Conservative social and 
political philosophy. 
Born in Bristol in 1878, Perry began his career in the motor trade in 1896 when he sold 
his stamp collection for a ticket to London and a chance to work for motoring pioneer Harry 
Lawson.25 After becoming friends with Ford a decade later, he was soon employed by the 
automaker, rising to managing director of Ford’s British business, where he helped create the 
company’s first English manufacturing plant at Trafford Park in Manchester. There, due to labor 
disputes in 191213, Perry instituted a policy of improved job security, reduced hours, and 
                                                        
23 “Glo’shire Debate on Unemployment,” Gloucestershire Echo (Cheltenham), 28 March 1935. 
24 Lawrence H. Summers, “Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?,” Journal of Labor 
Economics 5, no. 4 (October 1987): 57–86, at 69; Aims of Industry,“Equal Pay”: What It Is and 
What It Means (London, 1944). 
25 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, online ed., s.v. “Perry, Percival Lee Dewhurst, 
Baron Perry (1878–1956),” by Richard Davenport-Hines, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/48100, accessed 27 April 2015. 
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increased pay, which succeeded in breaking trade unionism and raising output.26 Indeed, Perry’s 
efforts became the inspiration for Ford’s famous five dollars a day program in Detroit.27 These 
actions, and Perry’s importance in the British business community, ensured that he was 
employed in government during World War One, where he was among a number of 
industrialists—most famously Eric Geddes, Lord Rhondda, and Sir William Weir—brought into 
Whitehall to increase production.28 Perry, though, was dismayed by the inefficiencies of direct 
government intervention in economic matters, especially regarding prices.29 Returning to private 
industry after the war, Perry spent much of the early 1920s building Britain’s first light industrial 
park, the Slough Trading Estate.30 This would go on to become the economic motor for Slough’s 
subsequent suburban development and was railed against by many in Britain’s rural 
preservationist movement, such as in John Betjeman’s famous poem about the town.31 Having 
made his fortune in Slough, Perry returned to work at Ford Motors. 
Politically, Perry exemplified the tradition of industrial paternalism. While many 
                                                        
26 Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill, American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents 
(Cambridge, 2011), 49. 
27 Ford R. Bryan, Henry’s Lieutenants (Detroit, 1993), 228. 
28 Peter K. Cline, “Eric Geddes and the ‘Experiment’ with Businessmen in Government, 
19151922,” in Essays in Anti-Labour History: Responses to the Rise of Labour in Britain, ed. 
Kenneth D. Brown (London, 1974), 74–104. 
29 Percival Perry, “National Economy,” Times (London), 3 December 1920. 
30 Burgess Wise David, Ford at Dagenham: The Rise and Fall of Detroit in Europe (Derby, 
2001), 15. 
31 David Matless, Landscape and Englishness (London, 1998), 35. 
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industrial paternalists had Liberal roots, by the 1930s the politics they represented were 
increasingly associated with the Conservative Party. Participating in anti-socialist organizations 
such as the strike-breaking Economic League and groups like the Industrial Welfare Association, 
prominent industrial paternalists included men like Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) chairman 
Harry McGowan, newspaper owner and consolidator Lord Illife, and the financier and hire-
purchase advocate John Gibson Jarvie.32 Their firms in newer and lighter industries had bucked 
the trend of British interwar industrial decline. As a result, interwar industrial paternalists shared 
a powerful faith—common to their intellectual antecedents, the “new paternalists” of the mid-
nineteenth century—in the civilizing power of modern industry. They believed that the ideas 
instituted within their own firms should be applied more widely to rescue Britain from an 
imagined moral and economic malaise.33 Industrial paternalists supported government attempts 
to rationalize and coordinate industrial production, providing social welfare via industry rather 
than the state, and encouraging high wages and profit sharing as a means to head off the growing 
power of trade unions. 
These policies, along with the rhetoric of partnership, cooperation, and shared progress, 
were, of course, not far from those promoted by the Conservative Party during the interwar 
period, especially after the creation of the National Government in 1931. Moreover, as Stuart 
Ball has recently demonstrated, this was an era when the push for the rationalization of industry 
and the removal of excessive competition had gained widespread support within the 
                                                        
32 Kit Kowol, “The Lost World of British Conservatism: The Radical Tory Tradition, 19391951” 
(DPhil diss., University of Oxford, 2014), 21–25. 
33 Patrick Joyce, Work, Society, and Politics: The Culture of the Factory in Later Victorian 
England (Brighton, 1980), 135–53. 
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Conservative Party as a means to relieve unemployment and offer an alternative to the socialist 
politics of nationalization.34 The National Government, for example, promoted numerous 
schemes for industrial consolidation, including in the vital steel and cotton industries. When seen 
together with Government support for workplace insurance and healthcare, the actions of 
industrial paternalists in their own firms were less an alternative to the New Conservatism of the 
period, with its emphasis on the moral, the professional, and the unprovocative, but rather an 
attempt to push accepted Conservative ideas and policies further and faster than legislation or 
government action would allow.35 
Given Perry’s interest in questions of wider political development, it is not surprising that 
he relished any opportunity to expand the ideological scope of Ford’s experiment. His chance 
came in 1933, when Ford sent an edict from Detroit that this experiment in American farming 
techniques should be run on a cooperative basis—a statement which reveals the heterodox way 
in which cooperation could be understood during the period.36 With this instruction, which gave 
leeway for Perry to introduce any form of cooperation he saw fit, the experiment took on a social 
as well as agricultural element. Speaking to the estate’s assembled workers in 1936, Perry clearly 
listed the objectives that guided the estate’s operation: 
1. The settlement of more people on the land. 
2. The bringing of more land into cultivation. 
                                                        
34 Stuart Ball, “The Conservative Party, the Role of the State and the Politics of Protection, 
c.1918–1932,” History 96, no. 323 (July 2011): 280303, at 285–86. 
35 John Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 19021940 (London, 1978), 206. 
36 Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA, 
1998), 329. 
 14 
3. To improve the lot of the agricultural worker by raising his wages, to better his 
standard of living and supply him with a more decent house to live in, and to 
increase his social well-being. 
4. To produce more food from the soil of the country. 
5. To increase the security of those who cultivate the soil and obtain for them a 
greater share of the fruits of their labour. 
6. To apply more modern methods to Agriculture by the use of tractors and 
machinery, the scientific study of exhaustion and replenishment of soil, etc.37 
 
These six aims demonstrate that the experiment had come a long way from Ford’s trumpeting of 
American farming techniques. Indeed, by 1933 Ford had largely lost interest in the estate; the 
automaker was, by this stage, more concerned with the progress of Fordlandia and his other 
American agricultural ventures. Nor was the Fordson Estate a simple marketing exercise 
designed to show off Fordson tractors. The Estate’s enormous expense, which eventually came 
to almost half a million dollars, made it a very poor investment in advertising.38 Rather, for Perry, 
it was an attempt to outline an alternative vision for British agriculture in which mechanization 
was a necessary but not sufficient part. Perry believed that the example of the Fordson Estate 
would show how new forms of land tenure, when embracing the cooperative ethic and high 
wages, could reverse rural depopulation and Britain’s increasing reliance on overseas food 
                                                        
37 “Speech by Sir Percival Perry,” 25 April 1936, Engineering Laboratory Office Records 
Subgroup, 19431944, Accession 285, Box 2681, 9, THF. 
38 F. A. Thompson to B. J. Craig, “Fordson Estates,” 18 April 1945, Fairlane Subgroup, 
Accession 1, Box 185, Folder 7, THF. 
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imports. The experiment thus aimed to show how self-consciously enlightened industrialists like 
Perry could use mechanization and other modern techniques to create a more productive, vibrant, 
and harmonious rural society rather than a reduction in living standards and further exodus from 
the land. In short, it would do for agriculture and the rural community what he and other 
industrial paternalists believed their policies could do for the rest of British industry. 
 
The Fordson Estate in Context 
Though historians, most notably Peter Mandler, have rightly critiqued the concept of 
interwar Englishness as a purely rural, nostalgic, and anti-modern phenomenon, it is also true 
that interest in agriculture and the celebration of rural life remained far out of proportion to the 
economic importance of the rural economy in the period.39 This was particularly the case within 
the Conservative Party. A party that was culturally and emotionally intertwined with rural 
England, interwar Conservatives saw themselves as having a special historical connection to the 
English countryside.40 At a time when, as Clare Griffiths has persuasively argued, the Labour 
Party contested the Conservative’s hold on the countryside, such an identity arguably became 
more important.41 As such, by engaging in questions related to the health of British agriculture, 
Perry was connected to debates that resonated beyond the farm gate. 
The first of these debates was the longstanding “land question.” Far from dying out in the 
Edwardian period, arguments over land ownership remained an issue for many Conservatives as 
                                                        
39 Peter Mandler, “Against ‘Englishness’: English Culture and the Limits to Rural Nostalgia, 
18501940,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 7 (1997): 155–75. 
40  Berthezène, Training Minds, 16985.  
41 Clare Griffiths, Labour and the Countryside (Oxford, 2007). 
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long as Labour was committed to land nationalization. 42 As part of its wider program, Labour 
argued that landlordism, like other forms of capitalist ownership, contributed not only to the poor 
state of industry but also maintained out-dated social hierarchies.43 Equally controversial was the 
debate about what role the state should play in private agriculture. Following the collapse of farm 
prices in 1929, the National Government introduced tariffs on a range of food stuffs, including 
wheat, and created a number of agricultural marketing boards that restricted imports and 
controlled marketing, pricing, and even production.44 A form of compulsory cooperation, such 
boards were hailed by many reform-minded Conservatives, such as Walter Elliot, the Minister of 
Agriculture, as part of an alternative corporatist “new economic order” that would lift Britain out 
of the slump.45 Likewise, it was not just the ownership of land or the control of farming that were 
at stake, but the question of what kind of farming should occur. The interwar years witnessed the 
emergence of an organic farming movement that challenged the growing business and 
commercial focus of those like Perry. Instead, men like Rolf Gardiner and Viscount Lymington, 
                                                        
42 F. M. L. Thompson, “Epilogue: The Strange Death of the English Land Question,” in The 
Land Question in Britain, 17501950, ed. Paul Readman and Matthew Cragoe (Basingstoke, 
2010), 257–70. 
43 Clare Griffiths, “Socialism and the Land Question: Public Ownership and Control in Labour 
Party Policy, 19181950,” in Paul Readman and Matthew Cragoe, eds., The Land Question in 
Britain, 17501950, 23756, at 242. 
44 Peter Self and Herbert J. Storing, The State and the Farmer: British Agricultural Policies and 
Politics (Berkeley, 1963), 88. 
45 Daniel Ritschel, “A Corporatist Economy in Britain? Capitalist Planning for Industrial Self-
Government in the 1930s,” English Historical Review 106, no. 418 (January 1991): 4165, at 58. 
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who sat in an uneasy ideological space between Fascism and High Toryism, argued for a return 
to an older, less intensive form of cultivation based around soil preservation and the revival of 
indigenous folk traditions—all as part of a wider plan to recreate the nation’s lost aristocratic 
leadership.46 Interacting with questions of ownership, government control, trade policy, and the 
moral character of the people, arguments about the health of agriculture and the rural community 
were not only a subject of political debate, but also an active site of it. Perry’s decision to 
undertake the Fordson experiment and broaden its social element was, therefore, a political act. 
Given the political issues at stake, Perry and Ford were far from alone in undertaking an 
experiment in rural revival. The interwar years saw the creation of a host of innovative 
agricultural ventures designed to test the applicability of different political and economic 
philosophies; their proponents hoped they would transform the country as well as the countryside. 
From the late 1920s onward, rural England became a literal test bed: a place to work out 
ideology in practice and to advertise solutions to wider problems of the political, economic, and 
moral dilemmas that were plaguing Britain, and in some cases, the modern world. As a result, the 
Fordson experiment was political not just in its form and content but also in its competitive 
                                                        
46 R. J. Moore-Colyer, “Rolf Gardiner, English Patriot and the Council for the Church and 
Countryside,” Agricultural History Review 49, no. 1 (2001): 187–209; R. J. Moore-Colyer, 
“Back To Basics: Rolf Gardiner, H. J. Massingham and ‘A Kinship in Husbandry,’” Rural 
History 12, no. 1 (October 2008): 85108; Richard Moore-Colyer and Philip Conford, “A 
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element—a point well recognized in press accounts that compared it to contemporaneous 
agricultural experiments.47 
As a result of the desire to relieve unemployment and the collapse of land prices, from the 
late 1920s onwards the English countryside was bursting with schemes for rural regeneration. 
Prominent among these was the project run at Dartington Hall by Leonard and Dorothy Elmhirst. 
Embracing modern farming methods, arts and crafts, and international performers, Dartington 
was positioned as an attempt to resurrect the social and economic functions of the medieval 
manor and to become a model for a more planned rural economy.48 By contrast, Rolf Gardiner, a 
far-right advocate of rural revival, developed his Springhead Estate in Dorset as a small self-
sufficient organic unit. His estate sprang from his belief in the importance of regional diversity 
and elite leadership, against what Gardiner believed to be the homogenising and Americanizing 
tendencies of modern Britain and the demand for a more planned and rationalized society 
coming from those like the Elmhirsts.49 The competition of different ideological and political 
traditions was not only between those with different attitudes to planning. For example, 
philosopher J. W. Scott ran his own Homecroft Movement for the unemployed near Gloucester 
as part of an attempt to demonstrate the utility of the ideas of C. H. Douglas and the Social 
Credit movement,50 while at Langenhoe in Essex distributionist ideas and the philosophies of 
Hillaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton informed a similar scheme.51 At times, religious motives 
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drove schemes forward. The Catholic Land Federation, for example, operated a scheme in 
Market Bosworth in Leicestershire to relieve unemployment,52 while at Brynmawr in South 
Wales, the Quakers took the lead role in a scheme to aid out-of-work miners.53 Testing theories 
about leadership, political economy, and religion, interwar ventures in making new rural 
communities were of course part of a longer history of using the land as a site for rebuilding or 
reimagining society on both the Left and on the Right—from the Owenite communities of the 
1810s to the dreams of peasant proprietorship advanced by Conservatives in the mid-nineteenth 
century. Yet, the differences between the Fordson Estate and other interwar agricultural ventures 
demonstrate not only the specificity of the era but the Conservative politics that were at the core 
of Perry’s experiment. 
In many ways the difference in the politics between the Fordson experiment and other 
schemes of rural generation are demonstrated in areas that, at first sight, do not appear political. 
To start with, there was none of the aesthetic medievalism that was on display at Dartington, 
with the Elmhirst’s restoration of the great hall’s hamerbeam roof and mediaeval courtyard. 
Instead, the Fordson Experiment combined the latest commercial architecture—its estate office 
was described as looking like a “Hollywood villa”—with a contrasting domestic architecture that 
sought to harmonize the modern with the traditional.54 The housing that the estate began building 
in 1935, with ever-rising costs that infuriated Ford, was deliberately built in the Essex vernacular 
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style, while also including modern amenities like electricity and a mainline sewage system. Nor 
was there an attempt to dictate or control the religious life on the estate, even though Perry 
supported Boreham’s local Anglican Church and organizations, like the IWS, which promoted 
“Christian feeling” in industry. This stood in stark contrast to activities at Market Bosworth with 
its Catholic theology, and also differed markedly from Henry Ford’s own position—the 
automaker enforced strict temperance in his factories and expected his American agricultural 
estate’s workers to attend services at the various chapels he built.55 Furthermore, Perry’s 
relationship to planning, though it was more hostile to state involvement than the Elmhirst’s, did 
not slip into denunciations of government activity in farming, as was the case with Gardiner. 
Rather, by creating a host of specialised “central” services to undertake marketing, bulk buying, 
and finance, Perry sought to balance the attention the state increasingly paid to agriculture in the 
form of marketing boards, along with the administrative burdens he believed such boards 
created.56 As Perry stated, such a form of organization allowed the agriculture industry to enjoy 
government support, while ensuring the individual farmer was not forced to “chew pencil ends 
and make returns when he really ought to be out on the land following the arbitrary dictates of 
nature.”57 
Most importantly, the Fordson Estate differed from other prominent experiments in rural 
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regeneration by not positioning itself as an escape or alternative to modern commercial society. 
Rather, by integrating the modern with the traditional, it was hoped that the positive possibilities 
of commercialization would be more completely realised. This was illustrated at the Fordson 
Estate not only by what they cultivated—at Fordson, unlike at Dartington, those areas deemed 
unprofitable were ruthlessly closed—but also how they sold their produce. Marketing Fordson’s 
vegetables as branded goods, the estate engaged in ingenious forms of advertising, such as 
selling cucumbers like cigars, with paper bands around their middle advertising their Fordson 
origin.58 Here, food was recognized for what it had become for Perry: a commodity to be bought 
and sold for profit (rather than, as for Lymington, as an end in itself). Also, in keeping with 
automotive marketing practice and the ideas behind Marketing Boards, the estate refused to work 
through what Ford held to be unproductive middlemen, instead selling the food directly to 
individual customers through stalls Spitalfield market and the Dagenham Plant. Here, this 
practice represented the twin temporal elements of conservative modernism: the belief that this 
was a more productive and efficient form of economic organization in an age of mass production, 
but also a means to restore the personal connection between producer and consumer that had 
been lost. The Fordson Estate, with its attempt to marry the modern and traditional, its support 
for a generalized but nonspecific Christianity, its desire for state support without bureaucracy, 
and its celebration of commercial industry, was therefore, not just the a manifestation of the 
culture of interwar Conservatism, but was an attempt to practice the conservative modernity 
which lay at its heart. 
Conservative modernity, and its links to wider Conservative politics, can best be seen when 
Fordson is compared to other schemes for rural regeneration that were sponsored or undertaken 
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by industrialists on both sides of the Atlantic, and which appear superficially similar. In Britain, 
the two most famous of these other industrialist-funded schemes were retailer John Lewis’s 
scheme in partnership farming at Leckford in Hampshire, and the cement manufacturer Sir 
Malcolm Stewart’s settlement for the unemployed at Potton in Bedfordshire. Indeed, the Potton 
Estate became the basis for the government’s own small-holdings scheme run by the Land 
Settlement Association (LSA) from 1934 onward. In both cases, the primary difference between 
these schemes and Fordson was not farming methods—Leckford embraced a similar focus on 
mechanization and the LSA’s scheme adopted a similar centralisation of core services—but 
rather the relationship with the local rural community. This went to the heart of Perry’s desire to 
regenerate not only the countryside but also its rural citizens. 
Fordson workers were encouraged to integrate themselves into the community, unlike at 
the LSA’s estates, where the desire to see each settler work his own individual plot often led to 
isolation. Leckford, too, sought to create its own community, but the Fordson Estate wanted to 
enmesh itself within that already existing at Boreham. The creation of a totalizing social 
environment—as was so often the case in company model villages such as Port Sunlight, Saltaire, 
or Bourneville—was not for Perry. At Fordson, no purpose-built social amenities were provided, 
as they were at both Leckford and on Ford’s US estates, where the automaker built schools, 
shops, hospitals, and kindergartens, and where he encouraged his employees to learn traditional 
crafts and dances.59 Similarly, the Fordson Estate worked through, rather than against, the 
existing paternal and spiritual structures of authority in Boreham village. To this end Perry made 
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significant donations toward the restoration of the local church.60 Perry was also a prominent 
supporter of events to raise funds for the village hall, and often opened up Boreham House to 
hold fêtes and other social occasions for villagers.61 Indeed, Perry shared the sentiment common 
to organizations like the Rural Community Council—who were funded in part by the Carnegie 
Trust—that the development of village halls was necessary to maintain the rural community as a 
distinct alternative to urban society.62 
Such support for existing local organizations and institutions was fundamental to the type 
of new rural citizen that Perry wanted to construct on the Fordson Estate. As Clarisse Berthezène 
has demonstrated, many Conservatives in the period imagined that citizenship flourished in the 
kind of organic society that Perry sought to recreate at Boreham.63 Rather than an understanding 
of citizenship that emphasized its communitarian dimension—and thus the necessity for 
economic equality to produce active citizens—the more individualistic Conservative version of 
citizenship focussed on equality of service and sacrifice over rights. Its aim was to integrate the 
nation’s citizens, of all classes, through civic equality and the socially ameliorative concept of 
shared duties. Such a version of citizenship would act as a counterpoise to socialist politics based 
on class tensions, as well as a bulwark against the growth of totalitarianism that, many believed, 
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relied upon a passive electorate.  
During the 1930s, Conservatives sought numerous ways in which to inculcate this form of 
citizenship with its emphasis on citizens’ communal duties and participation through established 
parliamentary politics. For some, such as the Conservative historian Arthur Bryant, the answer 
was to promote a Tory school of history that emphasized “sound” and “traditional” views on the 
evolution of Britain’s constitution.64 In a similar vein, Stanley Baldwin employed rhetoric that, 
alongside his wider educative efforts, celebrated Britain’s “apolitical” associational life and the 
class harmony and public service that organizations, from the Women’s Institute to the British 
Legion, embraced. 65 Still others, notably Noel Skelton, the Conservative MP and intellectual, 
promoted the idea of a “property-owning democracy,” as a means to engender civic 
responsibility and social maturity.66 Helping to support the organic and associational patterns of 
life of rural England was only part of Perry’s plan; his primary focus was, by contrast, to 
promote this Conservative understanding of citizenship specifically through work. 
In focusing on the workplace as a site for developing citizenship, Perry combined a belief 
in the paternalist duty to provide secure and stable employment with a faith that, by giving 
workers their share of profits, sympathy would grow up between employers and employed. Just 
as the Conservative MP Michael Seymour complained in 1930 that “the manufacturer or the 
employer in the industrial area must not keep his sense of social service for his suburban home,” 
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so Perry hoped that his profit-sharing scheme would ensure the creation of more “responsible” 
landlords as well as more “responsible” workers.67 If Conservatives like Baldwin, Bryant, and 
Skelton all sought to promote a Conservative vision of citizenship that they hoped would flow 
from the political realm to the industrial, Perry reversed this direction. For him—as for 
organizations like the Industrial Welfare Society, who sought to persuade employers to provide 
workplace social services, and the Economic League, who organized tens of thousands of factory 
“study circles” on the principles of capitalism—the hope was that class collaboration and 
cooperation in the workplace would be transformed into support for wider “constitutional” 
politics outside the factory gate.68  
Perry’s decision to widen the remit of the Fordson Experiment from an attempt to test 
farming techniques to a model of wider rural revival was thus deeply political––both in terms of 
Fordson’s competition with (and distinction from) other schemes for rural regeneration and in 
Perry’s desire to create a particularly Conservative type of rural citizen. Focusing on the 
construction of citizenship via work, the central part of Perry’s plans for the organization of the 
Estate was to adopt copartnership, a well-known vehicle for industrial collaboration, and rework 
it to meet the specific problems he identified with the English countryside. 
 
Copartnership for the Countryside 
At the heart of copartnership is a commitment to sharing a firm’s profits with workers after 
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provision has been made for rewarding capital. Though there had been experiments in 
copartnership in the coal trade during the 1860s, support for this form of economic organization 
amongst employers had fluctuated with levels of industrial conflict, peaking in the late 1920s.69 
Opposed by many in the Labour movement who saw it (often rightly) as an attempt to weaken 
trade unionism, the concept of copartnership was, in the 1920s, backed by important elements 
within the Conservative Party. These included the former Prime Minister Arthur Balfour—whom 
Perry described as a close friend—Harold Macmillan, and Lord Hugh Cecil.70 In fact, in 1927, 
Cecil attempted to push in cabinet his idea that the state provide tax breaks to firms engaged in 
the process.71 Copartnership was also strongly supported by Stanley Baldwin. Yet like his 
support for the idea of relocating factories to the countryside, Baldwin’s rhetoric—which 
included invoking the spirit of partnership at his father’s iron works—did not translate into 
legislative action.72 Instead, the Conservatives in office during the 1930s focussed on a voluntary 
approach to industrial relations, suggesting that, beyond exhortation, there was little that the state 
could do to ensure that workers and employers cooperated.73 Nor, as John Ramsden has argued, 
were such proposals for profit sharing always supported by the party’s working class activists, 
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who argued that they were merely palliatives and not an alternative to increasing the overall 
health of industry via tariffs.74 As such, from the late 1920s onward, copartnership as a policy, 
rather than as rhetoric, was more usually associated with the Liberal Party. 
Copartnership had long been associated with a number of Liberal-supporting 
employers—such as the chocolate manufacturer Seebohm Rowntree, the chemical industrialist 
Alfred Mond, and the soap magnate William Lever. It was also promoted as part of the 1928 
Liberal “yellow book,” Britain’s Industrial Future and Lloyd-George’s 1929 program We Can 
Conquer Unemployment.75 As with many of the other advocates of copartnership, who backed 
such schemes after 1945, in these Liberal texts profit sharing and copartnership were explained 
as a way to ensure workers did not consider themselves to be just tools in industry, but active 
partners in its success who were, therefore, more willing to engage in processes to increase 
efficiency.76Perry agreed with these aims. Indeed, he was a public supporter of the Profit-Sharing 
and Co-Partnership Association, one of a number of propaganda organizations that promoted the 
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concept.77 Yet, the way that copartnership was implemented on the Fordson Estate reveals 
Perry’s wider motives.  
The model of copartnership created by Perry for the Fordson Estate was complex. 
Following Ford’s request that the estate be run on cooperative lines, the estate was divided into 
three separate cooperative societies. Membership of the societies was open to all who had 
worked on the estate for at least two hundred days. Societies were then offered a thousand year 
lease and paid Ford and Perry a charge of 4 percent on the capital used to improve the estate. 
Alongside wages, calculated to be 25 percent above the county minimum, at the end of each year 
a bonus was paid. The amount a worker received as a bonus corresponded directly to the profit 
made by each society, divided in accordance with the distribution of wages. 
 Behind this form of organization stood Perry’s wider views on political economy, 
specifically his belief that capital was no more than the accumulation of unexpended rewards of 
past labour. As such, the aim of the scheme, Perry argued, was to remunerate capital and present 
labor appropriately. It was, as Perry wrote in 1945, a “crude attempt to deal with the ‘rentier’ 
problem and prevent the growth and building up of unearned increments and absentee vested 
interests.”78 Perry sought to remove the injustice of those who did most to increase the land’s 
value, namely the agricultural worker, receiving the slimmest financial reward. 
In determining the influence of Liberalism on the interwar Conservative Party historians 
like Julia Stapleton and David Thackeray have highlighted the extent to which Conservatives and 
the Conservative Party drew on rhetoric of “Englishness” and forms of campaigning that had 
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liberal roots. By contrast, at Fordson, Perry’s implementation of copartnership drew heavily not 
only on liberal ideas, but on specific policies adopted by the Liberal Party.79 Indeed, Perry’s form 
of organization was a direct attempt to blend plans for industrial copartnership with interwar 
Liberal land policies; these were influenced by the American political economist Henry George, 
who argued that the concentration of land was the underlying cause of poverty. Early 
incarnations of these land policies had taken the form of support for Land Value Taxation, 
preparations for which were controversially included in Lloyd George’s 1909 “People’s Budget.” 
By the early 1930s, however, Liberal policies on agricultural land had evolved. While continuing 
to embrace some Georgist elements, the policy of “cultivating tenure” had begun to take shape. 
Developed from 1923 under the auspices of Lloyd George’s rural land committee, and 
announced in the Liberal Party’s 1925 “green book,” titled The Land and the Nation, the new 
scheme involved the state purchasing agricultural land and leasing it back to farmers at a fixed 
rate—one which was net of the costs of improving the land and which thus excluded the land’s 
“monopoly value.”80 In order to assure that the land was worked properly, county agricultural 
authorities would supervise cultivation and arrange for the creation of new allotments, farms, and 
small holdings. The aims of this scheme were to ensure that tenants had security of tenure, that 
there was sufficient capital to invest in increasing the land’s productive ability, that land was 
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cultivated properly, and that any increase in its value went to the community.81 
The policy of “cultivating tenure” had been attacked outside and inside the Liberal Party 
as tantamount to nationalization.82 Perry’s alternative to “cultivating tenure” as represented in the 
organization of the Fordson Estate was a Conservative attempt designed to meet Liberal and 
Georgist ends without state involvement. The one thousand-year-long lease gave tenants security 
of tenure. The abolition of rent in favor of a 4 percent charge on capital provided an incentive to 
landowners to invest as they would in other industrial undertakings. Crucially, however, this 
investment did not provide any “unearned” reward for the increase in land values while profit 
sharing encouraged workers to maintain high levels of production. Equally important, it ensured 
that control rested in the hands of those who Perry believed were best able to exercise it––men 
with management experience, rather than civil servants. At Fordson, Perry and his fellow 
directors retained full control of the cooperative societies and decided who could, or could not, 
become or remain a member. Moreover, all of these changes designed to spur efficiency were to 
be achieved without any increase in government spending needed to compensate existing 
landlords. 
Examining the names of those involved with the estate confirms the links between the 
Fordson Experiment and the Liberal land campaign. The Fordson Estate’s board of directors 
included John Thomas Davies, Lloyd George’s private secretary between 1917 and 1922, and 
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Christopher Addison, a key advisor to Lloyd George on land taxation.83 Addison, who had joined 
Labour in 1923, hailed the Fordson experiment as a preferable alternative to Labour’s 
nationalization plans in his 1939 study A Policy for British Agriculture.84 Lloyd George himself 
also wrote to Perry to congratulate him on the experiment.85 Speaking in a 1954 interview, Perry 
explained the link between the Fordson Estate, the Liberal land campaign, and Georgist ideas. 
He stated that “Henry George has got it absolutely right in a brand new country where you didn’t 
have vested interests to keep up,” but that the Fordson Experiment was a more appropriate model 
for a country like Britain.86 The virtue of this scheme being that co-operators would work the 
land and own the profit from their endeavours while paternalistic landlords would be rewarded 
for their responsible attempts to improve its productivity. As such, though the ideas behind the 
scheme had a Liberal origin, the aim was to realize the Conservative ideals of intermeshed social 
relationships, in this case between workers and owners, and an equality of sacrifice with only 
those who played a part in increasing the health and wealth of the land as a whole receiving 
financial rewards. 
 While increasing efficiency and removing the problem of the “rentier” from agriculture 
was important for Perry, it was not the only advantage of the scheme. As Perry explained in one 
of the numerous speeches he gave to Fordson employees, the project was designed to improve 
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workers’ moral health and capacity for productive citizenship. First, Perry believed it would not 
only bring more men onto the land but would allow them to “work in the open air in a healthy 
occupation full of interest and variety; they have an opportunity to develop an independence of 
character far away from the dreary monotony and drab surroundings of shops and factories.”87 
Second, high wages and the shared profits offered by the estate enabled workers to, “realise their 
work was something valuable,” and employees were therefore not paid, “under the cloak of 
philanthropy [beneath which] workers have been underpaid for generations.” 88 In contrast to the 
initiative-sapping impact of philanthropy, Perry argued that high wages, like those paid in Ford 
factories, were the result of valid commercial decisions and increased productivity, by generating 
a sense of self-respect and the opportunity to engage in constructive leisure outside of work.89 
Finally, and most importantly, the scheme ensured that individual workers did not just benefit 
from the capitalist economy but also took part in it. As Perry proudly proclaimed in 1936, “as a 
result of our experiments over the last two years every one of our Co-operative workers has 
become a capitalist. It is most desirable they understand this.” 90  For Perry, economic and 
political citizenship were inherently interlinked. 
 Here, participation in the capitalist economy was not simply invested in generating 
“enterprise consciousness”—the replacement of class with employer identity so men and women 
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would think of themselves as Ford workers rather than just as workers alone. Rather, 
copartnership, like Conservative support for associational politics, was seen as a way of building 
citizenship, in this case a specific form of industrial citizenship. Participating in profit-sharing 
schemes gave workers a practical education in the vicissitudes of capitalist life and the reasons 
behind decisions taken by employers. Perry and his manager on the estate spent considerable 
time and effort explaining the reasons behind new cropping and marketing plans and why certain 
schemes on the estate, such as the plan to open a fruit bottling plant, had to be rejected. Likewise 
they offered a clear example and space for different class interests to come together. 
Most importantly, though, copartnership provided an opportunity for the cultivation of a 
specifically Conservative understanding of individualism. In common with the view of 
individualism shared by some of the more “classical liberal” proponents of copartnership—such 
as the Liberal MPs Henry Vivian and Harold Cox, and the publisher Ernest Benn—Perry argued 
that real individualism came from the voluntary sublimation of immediate selfish demands in 
favor of acting in the interest of the community.91 Cox, Vivian, and Benn nonetheless presented 
sublimation to the community in terms of “self-help”—providing for oneself through individual 
effort rather than relying on the state. 92 Perry, by contrast, explicitly linked the development of 
individualism to participation in the capitalist economy. To Perry, who believed that the interests 
of the community were best served by profitable farming, following the dictates of the capitalist 
economy thus became itself a form of individual development and a means to generate personal 
responsibility. 
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With his commitment to modernization of farming and managerial techniques, the 
abolition of the “absentee owner,” and the development of an independent and responsible 
workforce, Perry made clear that the experiment was meant as a template for other agricultural 
endeavors across the country.93 Pointing to the availability of other estates in a similar position to 
Boreham, he suggested that both the government and other industrialists would only be too 
pleased to receive the 4 percent return on their investment that the Fordson experiment generated 
for Henry Ford.94 Yet, it was not just agriculture and the rural community that, according to 
Perry, could benefit from following the Fordson Estate’s example. Rather, as Perry stated in 
1936, the experiment served as a wider example of how “to achieve a state of affairs in national 
life which, if attained, should prove to be a serious contribution to solving social and political 
problems which are now the cause of so much economic chaos and political unrest.”95 Fordson 
embodied principles that Perry believed were right for the country as well the countryside, yet 
their implementation was frequently socially problematic. 
 
The Fordson Estate:  Operation and Reception 
Accurately gauging the economic and agricultural success of the Fordson experiment is 
difficult due to its shifting size and the destruction of its financial records. Nonetheless, in the 
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decade between 1935 and 1945 (when the form of organization described above was fully in 
operation and financial records exist), the Fordson Estate appears to have performed well. In 
terms of providing more land-based jobs, the estate went from employing 2.68 men per one 
hundred acres to more than twice that number only two and a half years later. 96 Between 1935 
and 1945, these ratios grew further, if unevenly. By 1945, Perry was able to claim that at any one 
point in time during the previous decade, on average 200 hundred men had been employed 
across the estate. 97 Boreham Estate Co-Operative (one of the three societies that made up the 
Fordson experiment), for example, went from employing 6 men and 1 boy in 1931 to a 
workforce of 14 permanent employees in 1935.98 
Though the Fordson experiment succeeded in increasing the land’s productive ability in 
cash terms—sometimes dramatically, as in the case of one farm which went from generating 
revenue of £2,000 a year in 1931 to over £30,000 in 1935—the effect of the experiment on the 
overall profitability of the estate was more mixed.99 Higher wages and more expensive inputs 
meant that the individual societies did occasionally suffer losses, particularly in 1937 and 1939, 
when a series of severe frosts caused losses of £1152 and £253 respectively.100 By contrast, the 
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period between 1940 and 1945 were boom years. Wartime guaranteed prices meant that the 
estate as a whole made over £20,000 in 1945 alone—a figure almost ten times greater than the 
highest profit made prior to the outbreak of war.101 Such financial success allowed Perry to claim 
in 1945 that over the course of the preceding decade, 181 men had shared in total bonuses of 
over £147,000,102 with the average bonus being 45 percent of normal wages.103 Nonetheless, 
even in the less-favorable years of the mid-1930s, high bonuses were sometimes paid, with one 
worker receiving a bonus of £148 in 1935, and even the youngest boy taking home an additional 
£5.104 
These accomplishments triggered considerable publicity. In 1935, after learning of the 
large bonuses paid to workers and the estate’s success in mechanized farming, the Times 
recommended Perry and Ford’s methods be more widely adopted in schemes of land settlement 
and spoke of it as allowing men “a chance of winning economic independence.”105 The Irish 
Times also suggested their system be adopted in the Free State as an alternative to the 
government’s plans for small holdings, suggesting that it would “ensure the rapid development 
of an industry that has been too long neglected.”106 In the same vein, the Saturday Review argued 
that the Fordson Estate was an example of private enterprise “striding along” in reviving 
                                                        
101 “Meeting of Directors,” 2 March 1945, Fordson Estates Limited Records, Accession 
2004.102, Box 1, THF. 
102 Perry, Ten Years’ Romance, 8. 
103 Ibid., 17. 
104 “A Novel Experiment,” Cornishman (Penzance), 14 March 1935. 
105 Agricultural Correspondent, “Mechanization.” 
106 “Mechanised Farming Creates Employment,” Irish Times (Dublin), 5 November 1936. 
 37 
agriculture in comparison to the aloof attitude taken by the Government.107 Only the English 
Review, mouthpiece of the English Rural Right, was critical. The writer Ian MacPherson was 
worried that the example of Fordson might attract those to the land who had less respect for the 
traditional life of the English countryside. He nonetheless claimed that Fordson––as an example 
of what capital “judiciously applied can do to increase the productivity of these islands”––was in 
itself not without merit.108 
Despite MacPherson’s hesitation, the estate’s economic success and the breadth of 
coverage led the Ministry of Agriculture to take notice of the scheme in 1935. The Ministry, in 
fact, received a direct request from the Prime Minister’s office to examine Fordson’s 
operation.109 The results of these investigations were not favourable to Perry. The Ministry’s 
officials critiqued the estate for undercutting the competition by growing crops, like brussel 
sprouts, which were already produced in Britain. The likely effect of any wide-scale expansion 
of the Fordson method would be, as one official report in 1935 declared, “to throw out of action 
thousands of smallholders and market gardeners already trying to get a living off the land.”110 
Likewise, the Ministry determined that the estate’s success had less to do with mechanization 
and more the fact that it was exploiting the existing good quality of the soil by ploughing up 
what had been virgin parkland.111 
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Less clear in these reports is the extent to which Perry had achieved the “individualism” 
he had sought to cultivate on the estate. Though the numbers applying to work at Fordson 
suggest its attractions—there were five applicants for every job—gauging worker response to the 
scheme is difficult.112 No records survive relating to attempts at unionization on the estate, 
though it likely would have been met with strong resistance. In fact, for all Perry’s claims to 
have “settled” men on the land and provided “security of tenure,” workers’ contracts lasted only 
for a year, and men were frequently turned out if deemed unsatisfactory.113 
What is clear, though, is that Perry was disappointed by the actions of Fordson workers. 
In a discussion between one Ministry of Agriculture inspector and the estate’s manager, George 
Jones, the terminology used to describe workers reflected the classed way in which they were 
understood. Jones described how the best “material” were young lads, “material that can be 
developed on the desired lines” rather than older men with “set ideas” and “less flexible 
temperaments.”114 Nor were these young men seen to be reliable enough for positions of 
authority—Jones argued that “the material available in Essex” was “worthless” for jobs such as 
foreman, and instead recruited from his native Worcestershire in a practise that revealed the way 
identities of class and region remained intertwined.115 Moreover, even those who did survive for 
a year on the estate, and thus became full “co-operators,” proved paradoxically problematic as a 
result of the estate’s success. Perry recorded in 1945 that estate employees often received 
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bonuses many times their monthly wages and as a result, “many improvident workers took their 
surplus earning[s] and spent them unwisely.”116 In response to this, the estate first established a 
savings stall at the annual ceremonial distribution of bonuses, which was then followed by a 
voluntary savings scheme, and finally, after the failure of both of these to encourage workers to 
willingly save, the estate compulsorily saved 30 percent of workers bonuses on their behalf.117  
The relationship between the estate and Boreham village, the supposed heart of Perry’s 
revived organic community, is easier to determine. The estate’s imposition of rationalistic, 
universal understandings of legality over particular local customs and practices was frequently an 
issue. For example, overriding centuries-old traditions, villagers were prosecuted for gleaning the 
fields for unharvested produce.118 Similarly, an estate worker was jailed for what he believed to 
be the normal practice of using excess estate supplies to grow produce on his own land.119 By 
contrast, the community accused Ford and Perry of robbery when they sought to move a historic 
lodge once owned by Anne Boleyn to Ford’s model village outside Detroit. Ford only backed off 
when the Campaign for the Protection of Rural England, the key preservationist organization of 
the period, mounted a public campaign against him.120 Even greater conflict would occur over 
the laborers working at Fordson and the growing number of Irish seasonal workers employed. 
Described by Perry as, “frequently haphazard, irregular, irresponsible, and socially undesirable,” 
so-called casuals were a vital part of the estate’s economics, often making up more than 50 
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percent of the workforce.121 Such men were not only excluded from the copartnership scheme 
but also from the estate’s housing, and therefore were often found sleeping in ditches and 
haystacks. 122 This situation occasionally had tragic consequences, such as when, in 1933, the 
body of a laborer was found amidst the smoldering remains of a burnt-out haystack.123 The 
Parish council protested about this lack of accommodation and the presence of “undesirable 
labour employed by Fordson Estates that was impossible to control.”124 Indeed, after having 
complained to the local newspaper that the estate failed to employ out-of-work men from the 
village, one Boreham resident stated, “in other years Boreham has been peaceful, but now it is 
absolutely disgusting.”125 
Perry’s and Ford’s dream of applying methods of self-consciously modern industry to 
maintain traditional rural life thus contained numerous paradoxes. First, there was the conflict 
between the desire for profitability and the effect this had on the wider rural economy. Second, 
the dream of revitalizing traditional village life clashed with the imposition of an alien workforce 
and new legal practices. Finally, and most especially, the hope of developing individual 
responsibility by turning workers into capitalists was contradicted by the dismay with workers 
who, like their employers, might do what they wished with their newfound wealth. The last of 
these issues engaged Perry and the estate in a wider dispute among Conservatives committed to 
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reducing unemployment by moving men to the land. 
Having heard of the Fordson Estate’s successes, Perry was visited by L. D. Gammans, 
Chief Executive of the English Land Settlement Association (LSA). A military officer and 
colonial civil servant, Gammans had toured Canada and India in 1930, hoping to discover a 
means to restore the prosperity of agriculture. He returned committed to the ideals of the LSA, an 
organization fostering the positive effects of self-supervised work on character development. 
Visiting the Fordson Estate in 1935, he was dismayed by what he saw. While Perry claimed, in 
common with Ford, that mechanized copartnership farming removed the drudgery of small 
holding and provided high wages and a share of the profits, Gammans saw something quite 
different: a regime where absolute power was vested in the hands of Perry.126 For Gammans, 
Fordson was not a model for the future of British farming, let alone a solution to unemployment; 
it was “an experiment in co-partnership syndicated farming conducted under Fascist auspices.”127 
The strength of Gammans’s language speaks to the fact that this was a wider, more 
profound ideological dispute than a conflict over farming methods. In one respect the debate 
between Gammans and Perry reflected a divide between Conservatives, like that between 
advocates of copartnership, about how best to cultivate the kind of responsible individualism 
they wished to see. On one side stood Perry, and indeed a number of other industrial paternalists, 
who saw individualism made possible by collective participation in the capitalist economy, the 
high wages, and a variety of activities that modern industry would bring. This would, they hoped, 
provide workers with the resources they needed to develop their own character. On the other side 
stood Gammans, and those like Noel Skelton and other Conservatives committed to wider 
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property ownership, who saw individualism as stemming from the independence and security 
that property brought. Yet, this debate was also about the relationship between freedom and 
paternalism—argued between those who saw independence as possible only within structures of 
paternalistic authority and those who saw those very structures as a negation of liberty. Indeed, 
as Jon Lawrence has shown, such debates in many ways went beyond the Conservative Party and 
characterized Britain’s own “path to modernity.”128 
After the Second World War, arguably, the suggestion that property was the key to 
freedom came to predominance within the Conservative Party, with its emphasis on the 
“property owning democracy” in the 1950s and popular shareholding in the 1980s. Indeed, 
Gammans, who by 1942 had become a Conservative MP, played a leading role in this by 
becoming the principle post-war advocate of council tenants “right to buy.”129 During the 
interwar period, however, both approaches continued to work alongside one another in the 
context of the need to develop a specifically Conservative form of citizenship at a time when 
Conservatives feared the development of both the extreme Left and Right. As such, when a 
government enquiry was set up in 1939 to investigate the future of land settlement schemes 
across England and Wales, it supported the Welsh Land Settlement Society, which had modelled 
their farming and copartnership arrangements specifically on the Fordson Estate.  This Welsh 
society was assessed by the enquiry to be both more economical and preferred by workers 
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themselves.130 In short, the enquiry supported the type of organization embodied in the Fordson 
experiment.  
 
Conclusion 
This 1939 declaration in favour of Perry’s version of farming and land settlement would 
prove to be the high point for the Fordson Estate. Though the estate recorded its highest profits 
during the Second World War, these were largely due to agricultural prices guaranteed by the 
government—a form of direct state intervention in the economy to which the Fordson 
experiment had been set up to act as an alternative. The war also cut into the estate both literally 
and metaphorically. Large areas of land were given over to the construction of an American 
airbase in 1943, just as the Essex War Agricultural Committee challenged the control that Perry 
exercised over the estate. Even Perry and Ford’s gendered understanding of farming came under 
attack as a result of the war, as members of the Women’s Land Army were based on the estate in 
1940.131 Yet, the Second World War did more than simply disrupt the life of the estate; it also 
transformed the political context in which it operated. The title of Perry’s 1945 book on the 
experiment, Ten Years’ Romance, reflects not just the romance of his idealised rural community, 
but also the nostalgia for a lost political moment when it seemed possible that the principles of 
enlightened ownership, copartnership, and economic modernization could be harmonized and 
adopted across the country. 
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The estate had been purchased and developed in the early 1930s at a time of Conservative 
electoral hegemony. It represented an attempt to do outside Conservative politics what was 
believed to be impossible within a National Government committed to holding its disparate 
political elements together. Fordson was not an alternative to Conservative Party policies or the 
culture of conservative modernity; it embraced them. After 1940, and especially after 1945, both 
Perry’s strategy and the wider type of Conservative politics it represented seemed outdated. 
Perry’s dream of creating an economic structure that transcended the imagined poles of laissez-
faire and state ownership were incompatible with a situation where the economy had already 
become planned and controlled, and where significant industries had already been nationalized. 
His hope of engendering greater cooperation between employers and employees was similarly 
outmoded in a period when trade unions had come to be seen—even among the most intransigent 
employers like Perry—as the legitimate representatives of justified sectional interests.132 Too 
piecemeal and long term in its aims, the Fordson Experiment also appeared incompatible with a 
wartime moment when, as Bill Schwarz has argued, a collapse of an entire Conservative culture 
had occurred and where “the very categories of democracy, citizenship and welfare” had been 
transformed, “leaving Conservatism broken and incoherent.”133 
It was within this changed political context that Perry founded the Conservative ginger 
group Aims of Industry in 1942 in order to halt what he saw as the ever expanding scope of 
bureaucracy, which, he declared, was “the antithesis and negation of all which we think we are 
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fighting and hold most dear.”134 Perry saw this bureaucracy as potentially totalitarian long before 
Churchill uttered his infamous remarks during the 1945 general election about the potential need 
for a gestapo under a Labour government.135 Though Aims of Industry initially put forward a 
political program that mixed this more assertive antisocialism and anti-Statism with the politics 
of the Fordson Experiment writ large—including statutory economic rationalization, minimum 
wages, and copartnership—by 1947 Aims of Industry and Perry’s own personal politics had 
slipped into simple negative denunciations of growing state socialism.136 Aims of Industry would, 
in fact, later be converted into an influential pressure group that, in working with a variety of 
free-market think tanks in the 1970s, campaigned against the kind of planned industrial 
rationalization and coordination its founder had once supported. 
A similar ideological transformation occurred on the Fordson Estate itself. Robbed of its 
political raison d’être after the Second World War, the estate also lost its principle funder with 
the death of Henry Ford in 1947. Perry and a group of investors used this opportunity to purchase 
the entire estate. Though the renamed Co-Partnership Farms was no longer held up as a model 
for the future of British agriculture, let alone British politics. The commitment to copartnership 
(except in name) was watered down and the Liberal and Georgist ideas that underpinned this 
particular implementation of copartnership were abandoned. Following Perry’s death in 1956, 
the estate was eventually sold to the pension fund-financed Fountain Farming Group—precisely 
the kind of absentee owners that Perry had once actively sought to exclude. Even Boreham 
House is now no longer connected to Ford, Perry, or even to agriculture. Today, alongside so 
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many other country houses, it serves as a wedding venue and corporate function center. 
Yet, if the Fordson Estate was not the success its creators dreamed it would be, this 
should not detract from the analytical use that comes from studying its origins and development. 
In particular, the history of the Fordson Estate allows a more detailed and specific examination 
of the idea of conservative modernism. While, as a cultural and literary phenomenon, 
conservative modernism was a reaction to the traumas of the First World War, the story of 
Fordson reveals the extent to which it was also, for some Conservatives, a conscious and 
practiced political project. It was a way of thinking and acting which was driven by the desire to 
engage with other political actors and ideologies that contested the direction that Britain’s 
modernity would take, from the dreams of moving forward to a rationalized and planned society 
to the wish to return to an imagined era of Victorian individualism. In this case, Fordson acted as 
an alternative to the host of other plans for rural land settlement, which emanated from across the 
political spectrum and promised to use land as a test bed for a wider, radical remaking of society. 
Likewise, this was a conservatism that, in looking backward as well as forward, drew frequently 
not just on Conservative ideas of the past but, as in Perry’s enthusiasm for the ideas of Henry 
George, liberal ones from the present. Equally, the personal (or perhaps the personnel) politics of 
building Conservative citizens was one which went to the very heart of the Fordson Experiment, 
with Perry and Ford’s desire to transform, not only the land, but the moral character of those who 
worked on it. 
Here, the Fordson Experiment also helps illuminate the multiple and contested ways in 
which Conservatives sought to create independent, self-reliant citizens. It highlights the divisions 
between those who saw “responsible” citizenship beginning in the industrial rather than political 
arena. Likewise it emphasizes the difference between those who, like Perry, argued paternalism 
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was necessary for workers to win their independence against others, like Gammans, who 
believed that paternalism was the antithesis of individualism. Equally, it shows the extent to 
which the goal of making workers responsible and independent were predicated on the 
stereotype that workers were inherently lazy, feckless, and in need of organization by others—a 
form of organization, which, in the case of Fordson, made independence available to a select few 
male, permanent, and thrifty employees.  The implication, here, is that anti-Socialism and pro-
Conservatism were not just two, unrelated appeals made by interwar Conservatives, but rather 
two sides to the same coin.137  
Most importantly, though, the history of the Fordson experiment and its form of 
conservative modernism speaks to the experimental and even radical potential for this form of 
Conservatism—particularly in relation to the English countryside. This argument about the 
radical nature of interwar Conservatism stands in direct contrast to the work of David Matless in 
his pathbreaking analysis of Britain’s preservationist movement and the Landscape of 
Englishness they helped construct in the interwar and immediate post-war period.138 In it, 
Matless argues that preservationist planning—as represented in groups like the Campaign for the 
Protection of Rural England, with their commitment to restoring rural England through 
modernization—was out of tune with the political philosophy of Baldwinite Conservatism. 
Matless suggests that Baldwin’s “Conservative Englishness of social harmony, constitutional 
caution, organic culture and pastoral community is a site for neither anger nor action.”139 While 
Matless is undeniably correct in suggesting that Conservatives were often unwilling to use the 
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state to remake the English countryside, the project of the Fordson Estate reveals there was much 
more action involved in preservationism and the creation of a “landscape of Englishness” than 
simply planning or legislative activity. Rather, Conservatives like Perry could turn to their own 
factories, offices, shops, and farms and use their own means and resources to create the rural 
England of their conservative imaginations. To use a term that would have infuriated 
Conservatives, this was conservatism as praxis not just political philosophy. In 1924 Baldwin 
stated, “I refrain, as I always have done, from displaying visions of a new heaven and a new 
earth emanating from Whitehall,” but this did not mean that other Conservatives did not seek to 
create such utopian conditions. Rather, they, like he, simply recognized that Whitehall was not 
always the correct vehicle for them.140 
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